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Introduction
In his book The Economic Development of Japan: The Path of Development from the Status of a Devel-
oping Country, Professor Kenichi Ohno writes: ?After its success in modernisation, Japan became a 
threat to the entire East Asia.?1
This paper argues that the Japanese expansion into the whole region of East Asia, including South-
east Asia, was the outcome of this modernization process which started in the Meiji period.
1. The Doctrine of ?Greater East Asia?
The Meiji reform, with its strategic goal of ?learning from the West, catching up with the West and 
surpassing the West,? transformed Japan. From a country that was hundreds of years behind Euro?
American nations in terms of development, Japan rose to the position of the world?s 35th largest econo-
my by the end of the Meiji era. After the First World War, Japan even participated in international 
forums as one of the world?s five largest powers, together with the US, the UK, France and Italiy.
Japan?s rapid economic development of Japan, however, also nurtured the rise of extreme national-
ism, which quickly dominated the country?s political agenda and pushed Japan toward the path of co-
lonialism through the wars of invasion, thus posing a threat to the sovereignty of neighboring nations.
Within this historical context, the doctrine of ?Greater East Asia? was born, which brought Japan to 
brutal wars in the early 20th century.
The doctrine of ?Greater East Asia? was a concept that had its root in the 19th century. Its key idea 
was that the Japanese was superior to all other Asian peoples. A famous reformer in the Meiji era, 
Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835?1901), in his book, The Role of Japan in Asia (1882), argued that Japan should 
be the leader of the entire Asia. In the 20th century, another famous writer, Kita Ikki (1883?1937), drew 
public attention in Japan when he declared that it was a Japanese mission to rescue Asia from the dom-
ination of Western colonial powers, even using armed force if necessary.
?1 Kenichi Ohno (2007), The economic development of Japan?The Path of Development from the Status of a Developing Country, 
(Hà Nội: Vietnam Development Forum, 2007), p. 115.
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Kita Ikki?s view originated from a principle known as hakkō ichiu (???? bát hoành nhất vũ, 
meaning ?the world under a single roof?) articulated by Tanaka Chigaku (1861?1939), a Buddhist 
scholar from the Nichiren school, and a propagator of extreme nationalism in the Meiji era. According 
to Tanaka, this principle meant that more and more power should be granted to a single sovereign un-
til the world was united. While Tanaka predicted that the unity of the world would be achieved 
through the moral leadership of the Japanese Emperor, followers of extreme nationalism in Japan ap-
plied this idea into the goal of liberating Asia from the domination of Western colonial powers and 
turning Japan into the most powerful country in East Asia.
This goal coincided with the aim of territorial expansion of the Meiji government. Japanese leaders 
believed that they had to establish a zone under their influence surrounding their own territory to pro-
tect Japanese benefits against the threat from the West. In a speech at the first Imperial Parliament, the 
Premier Aritomo Yamagata stated:
There are two ways to protect and defend the nation. The first is to protect the zone of sover-
eignty. The second is to protect the zone of interests. The zone of sovereignty means the na-
tion?s borders, while the zone of interests includes the area surrounding the nation to protect 
the security of her sovereignty. There is no country that does not try to protect both of these 
zones. In the current situation, protecting the zone of sovereignty alone is not enough so as to 
protect our independence and our interests from the threat of the West. We need to protect 
the zone of interests as well.2
It was those ideas of extreme nationalism that drove Japan into the wars with China (1894?1895) 
and Russia (1904?1905). In particular, the victory against the Russians convinced the Japanese that the 
country had become one of the leading global powers, on par with Western nations. From that time 
onward, the sense of national pride rose high and pushed Japan further into the path of colonialism.
In July 1927, Japan?s Premier Tanaka submitted a proposal to the Emperor, which included a de-
tailed plan to conquer the world. The proposal read  as follows:
If Japan does not pursue an aggressive agenda, we cannot overcome the many challenges 
we face in East Asia? If we want to dominate China, we must defeat the U.S. And if we want 
to defeat the US, we must use the strategies we used in the war with Russia. If we want to con-
quer China, we must firs conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. If we want to conquer the world, 
we need to conquer China. If we can conquer China, other Asian nations will fear us and sur-
render to us. Then the whole world will recognize that East Asia is ours and no-one will dare 
to violate our benefits. We will then conquer India, Indonesia? and even Europe.3
?2 Quoted in ibid., p. 102.
?3 Chiêm Tế, Phương Đông từ sau Cách mạng Tháng Mười Nga (1917?1959) (Hà Nội: Văn Sử Địa, 1959), p. 224.
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After coming into oﬃce, on August 1, 1940, Premier Konoe Fumimaro extended the concept of 
?Greater East Asia? to the ?Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.? He advocated the formation of a 
new order to provide ?co-prosperity? to all Asian nations, an order in which Asian countries would 
have peace and be freed from the domination of Western countries under the protection of a benevo-
lent Japan. According to this plan, the ?Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere? included three circles.
? The central circle, including Japan, Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, China and Taiwan.
? The supply circle, including the Philippines, French Indochina, Malaya and the Indonesian archi-
pelago.
? The defense circle, including Burma, New Zealand, and the Bismarck, Caroline and Marshall Is-
lands.
On November 5, 1943, Japan held the Conference of Greater East Asia in Tokyo, with the participa-
tion of representatives of pro-Japanese governments, including: the Nanjing Nationalist Government 
(China), Manchuria, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and Overseas Indians. On November 6, the 
Conference released a joint statement in which all participating governments promised to dedicate 
their entire capacity and resources to realize the Greater East Asia co-prosperity.4
However, by that time, Japan?s domination in East Asia was already threatened by the resistance 
movements within the Greater East Asia as well as the Allied counter-attacks.
2. Conquering Vietnam?A Key Territory in Japan?s Pursuit of the ?Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity?
In 1937, having conquered the entire territory of China, the Japanese government began its process 
of Southward Advance in pursuit of the plan of Greater East Asia. After Japan conquered Hainan (Feb-
ruary 1939), the Shinan (Paracel) Islands (February 10, 1939) and the Spratly Islands (March 30, 
1939),5 Indochina became the next target. If they succeeded in conquering Indochina, Japan would 
achieve two main goals:
? First, it could stop external supplies to China through route from the Hải Phòng port to Kunming. 
Moreover, Japan could use this route, if necessary, to attack southern China.
? Second, it could utilize Indochina as a base to launch further advancement into Southeast Asia, 
pushing Western powers out of the region, and establish the ?Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere.?
After Hitler attacked Denmark using paratroopers on April 9, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister 
presented several proposals to the French government regarding the future of Indochina. Although the 
US. Secretary of State Cordell Hull strongly opposed these proposals, the French had no choice but to 
concede, as France had been defeated in Europe and the its forces in Indochina could no longer defend 
the colony against a Japanese attack.
?4 Trần Minh Tiết, Tìm hiều người Nhật Bản: để biết rõ những nhược điểm của ta (Hà Nội: NXB Thế giới, 2015 reprint), p. 75.
?5 The Japanese at the time used the name Shinam to refer to the Paracel Islands. 
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On June 18, 1940, the Yonai government requested French Governor-General Catroux in Indochina 
to accept a Japanese military delegation to work in Indochina. Tokyo?s aim was to cut oﬀ the trans-
ports between Tonkin and China that were vital to the Chiang Kai-shek forces. Catroux agreed to the 
Japanese demand. Thus on June 20, 1940, the Japanese delegation arrived in Hanoi.
On June 29, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro released a long speech in which he 
referred to a natural connection between the countries in the Far East and those in Southern Seas (i.e., 
Southeast Asia). He proposed that ?a more stable force? should be stationed there to ensure the 
?co-prosperity.? A ?new order? would be necessary in the Far East. He also added that this plan would 
be pursued by peaceful measures. This statement dissatisfied the Japanese military and the Yonai gov-
ernment was forced to resign. Duke Konoe Fumimaro established a cabinet for the second time, with 
General Tojo Hideki as the Minister of War. Right after this, the new government secretly drafted a 
plan with two main points, first to quickly terminate the war in China, and second to solve the issue of 
?new order? with Asian countries.
To implement this plan, on August 1, 1940, the Japanese Navy Department of Staﬀ published the 
document ?Research on the policies on Indochina,? emphasizing three reasons why Japan had to con-
quer Indochina as soon as possible.
? To use Indochina as the jumping-oﬀ point to conquer Burma and Malaya.
? To take possession of Cam Ranh, one of the most important military ports in the world, which 
was situated on the navigation route from Singapore to Hong Kong, from the South China Sea to 
Bangkok, Manila, Sarawak and northern Borneo.
? To facilitate the military transportation to the Pacific front once the war broke out.6
On August 2, 1940, the Konoye Cabinet sent an ultimatum to the Vichy government, demanding 
that Japanese army be allowed to enter Tonkin and to take control of airports.
Through the intermediary role of Germany, French Ambassador Arsène-Henry and Foreign Minis-
ter Matsuoka signed a treaty in Tokyo on August 8, 1940. France agreed that Japan could transport 
troops via Tonkin to support military operations in China, build and use airports in Tonkin, and sta-
tion troops in Tonkin to protect its military bases. In exchange, Japan would ?respect France?s benefits 
in the Far East, particularly the territorial integrity of Indochina and France?s sovereignty over the en-
tire Indochina.?7 This treaty marked a big compromise of France?s and also the beginning of the ?coop-
eration? between France and Japan in Indochina.
To avoid confrontation, on September 21, 1940, France allowed Japan to station 6,000 troops in 
Tonkin, and fully utilize four airports in Tonkin as well as the Hải Phòng  to transport 25,000 soldiers 
to Yunnan.
?6 Phan Ngọc Liên, ?Chiến lược của Nhật Bản?, in Sở Văn hoá Thông tin, Trung tâm Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn Thành phố Hồ 
Chí Minh, Chứng tích Pháp-Nhật trong chiến tranh xâm lược Việt Nam (1858?1954) (Hồ Chí Minh City: NXB Trẻ, 2001), 
pp. 367?8.
?7 Vĩnh Sính, Nhật bản Cận đại (Hà nội: NXB Lao động, 2014), p. 269.
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Japan, however, was not satisfied with these compromises and continued their aggressive policy. On 
September 22, 1940, the Japanese army from southern China attacked French military bases alongside 
the Lạng Sơn road, forcing French troops to surrender. Thus, the Japanese oﬃcially came to Indochina 
and ?became the true masters. The French became a kind of respected slaves. And the people of Indo-
china came under two levels of domination. They were not only slaves to the Japanese, but also slaves 
to the slaves of the Japanese.?8
With the new military bases in Tonkin, the Japanese could: (1) cut oﬀ the Allied supply line to help 
the Chongqing government, especially the railway from Hai Phong to Kunming; (2) to make air at-
tacks against the military and economic bases of the Chongqing government and the inland road from 
Myanmar to Yunnan; (3) facilitate further advance to other Southeast Asian countries, particularly 
Thailand and Burma, two other rice bowls in Southeast Asia. In actuality, Indochina, Thailand and 
Burma altogether occupied 95? of global rice exports.9
After moving into Indochina, Japan repeatedly forced the French to make new compromises and 
sign new treaties in favor of Japan in all aspects economic, military, cultural, and ideological. Accord-
ing to the treaty on July 29, 1941 under the name of ?Indochina?s joint defense,? the Japanese troops 
were granted limitless travel mobility across the territory of Indochina. The next military treaty on De-
cember 8, 1941 promised that the French colonial government had to provide military equipment, es-
tablish military bases and provide supplies to the Japanese Army. In the south, the Japanese Army took 
control over airports and seaports, including the areas surrounding Cam Rank bay and several airports 
surrounding Sai Gon area. All the military bases in Indochina were to be used by the Japanese for their 
war eﬀorts in Southeast Asia.
Within only six months after the Pearl Harbor attack and the declaration of war (December 8, 1941), 
the Japanese flag had replaced those of the UK, the US and the Netherlands over a vast stretch of  terri-
tory spanning 9,500 kilometers from Bruma to the Gilberts Islands on the Pacific, with a total area of 
seven million square kilometers and a population of 400 million. However, this was the maximum lim-
it of the Japanese Empire in its eﬀorts of territorial expansion under the policy of ?Greater East Asia 
Co-prosperity Sphere.?
3. A New ?Greater East Asia? Doctrine
During the 30 years since the failure of the ?Greater East Asia? doctrine, the situation in East Asia in 
general and Southeast Asia in particular had underwent substantial changes. After the end of the Viet-
nam War in 1975, Japan tried to reaﬃrm its position in Southeast Asia. In 1977 when Premier Takeo 
Fukuda made a speech in Manila after he attended the first ASEAN?Japan summit in Kuala Lumpur, 
relations between Japan and Southeast Asia were already much warmer. In this speech, later known as 
?8 Dixee R. Bartholomew-Feis, OSS và Hồ Chí Minh?Đồng minh Bất ngờ trong cuộc Chiến Chống Phát-xít Nhật, tr. Lương Lê 
Giang (Hà nội: NXB Thế giới và Công ty Văn hòa và Truyền thông Võ Thị, 2007), p. 51.
?9 Vĩnh Sính, Nhật bản Cận đại, p. 270.
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the Fukuda Doctrine, he announced a new Japanese policy toward Southeast Asia, including three pil-
lars:
1)? Japan is a peace-loving country that does not accept the role of a military power, and thus is de-
termined to contribute to peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia and in the world.
2)? Japan is a true friend of Southeast Asian countries, and will try its best to strengthen the relation 
of mutual trust in a wide range of aspects, including political, economic, social and cultural.
3)? Japan will be an equal trading partner of ASEAN and its member states, and will cooperate pro-
actively with these countries to strengthen solidarity and the development of these countries, 
together with other countries outside the region that share the same political agenda. The aim is 
to foster a relation based on mutual understanding with Indochinese countries and to contrib-
ute to the development of peace and prosperity across Southeast Asia.
The ?Fukuda Doctrine? provided guidelines for the development of the relation between Japan and 
ASEAN countries in the new era. However, given what happened in the past, whether they wished or 
not, the people of Southeast Asia still retained memories of the brutal invasion and domination of 
Japan during the period of the ?Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.?
For 20 years since the ?Fukuda Doctrine,? we have witnessed tremendous changes in the strategies of 
countries in the world and in the Asia-Pacific. Like other nations, Japan has had to readjust its policy 
to the changing situation. For example, Premier Hashimoto Ryutaro made an important speech in Jan-
uary 1997 during his visit of five ASEAN countries, proposing a new era of wider and closer partner-
ship between Japan and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia had always occupied an important position in 
Japan?s strategies. And with the ?Hashimoto Doctrine,? Japan, for the first time since Japan?s unsuc-
cessful attempts of propagating the ?Greater East Asia? doctrine in the Second World War, publicly an-
nounced its ambition of raising its political posture in the region.
Today, in the context of China?s ?non-peaceful rise,? and the worrying situation in the South China 
Sea, Premier Shinzo Abe has initiated a new ?Greater East Asia? doctrine. He emphasizes the impor-
tance of a joint eﬀort between Japan and India to take more responsibility for ensuring maritime secu-
rity from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Japan wants to ally itself not only with India, but also with 
Australia. He also emphasizes the vital importance of US?Japan alliance. And he even calls for a ?dia-
mond alliance? between the USA, Japan, India and Australia to protect the maritime community from 
the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific. In addition, Japan also expresses its hope to strengthen its ties 
with Southeast Asian countries, as well as the Western countries such as UK and France.
This new policy is a readjustment of the ?Fukuda Doctrine? to the new context, or in other words, 
the ?new Fukuda Doctrine? or the new ?Greater East Asia? doctrine. However, ?Greater East Asia? 
nowadays has a new meaning. It now means the expansion of alliance with regional countries in the 
context of serious threats to the regional security, in order to maintain peace, stability and develop-
ment of the world in general and the region in particular.
However, it is also true that the Abe Administration?s decision and the Japanese parliamentary vote 
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for the reinterpretation of the 1946 Constitution has raised concerns in the region about a come-back 
of the wartime version of ?Greater East Asia? doctrine.
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